ABSTRACT
This article sets out to examine the public policy evaluation model, which is applied for evaluating public policy in Lithuania. The data was collected from the papers published by local researchers, official documents available at the ministries and agencies websites and other printed materials. Qualitative data for this paper was taken from the series of individual interviews with public officials and evaluators (conducted 200–2010). The data was supplemented with quantitative data from the survey about the scope and significance of evaluation in Lithuania (conducted in 2010). It was found that monitoring system was weak designed and required significant reinvention. The reinvention of the monitoring system will built base for the future evaluation of the results. It is suggested that that the greatest demand for the effectiveness, efficiency and productivity in the government leads to the highest use of performance management and evaluation as a tool for decision-making.

KEY WORDS: evaluation, program, monitoring, Lithuania.

JEL CODES: D730, D780, D790, H830, L380

Introduction
Evaluation of public policy has been applied in Lithuania only recently, and a certain impact of this tool is noted while administering the support of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. However, the information about evaluation has not been perfect yet. Evaluation is institutionalized in the Lithuanian administration system. An evaluator is a new social role, and, as we know from anthropology and sociology, rights, duties, expectations, etc. are typical for any role. In addition, the role of an evaluator is related to other roles, i.e. politicians, administrators or citizens. Rules of behaviour exist for any given pair of relationship or the norms and corresponding configurations of power; thus not only time, but also will is necessary to include evaluation into the agenda. In the process of evaluation consolidation, the evaluator has the right to ask specific questions and demand for certain information and charge the people to use evaluation results. While analyzing the development of the evaluation function, it is important to know how evaluation influence appears, mediates, is blocked or develops or, speaking instrumentally, how the influence of any evaluation may be increased. The research on policy evaluation, as well as many other retrospective instruments of public policy, faces the lack of data.

The amount of data about the outcomes of public policy instruments, which was provided a decade ago, is significantly bigger in comparison to the information on public policy evaluation provided only several years ago. Apparently, the need to clarify how public policy evaluation is applied in the Lithuanian political and administrative environment exists. Of course, it is not necessary to wait for several decades for the information about the implementation of public policy evaluation in post-communist countries. The more
institutionalized evaluation is, the more difficult it will be to make changes while reconstructing the process of evaluation/the mechanism and compare with earlier stages of implementation.

The aim of this paper to analyze and generalize the public policy evaluation model, which is applied for evaluating public policy in Lithuania.

The configurative-idiographic method of case study was applied for the analysis of public policy evaluation in Lithuania. The application of this case study type allowed understanding the internal way of operation of the case and the fundamental characteristics of evaluation in Lithuania. The data for the analysis were collected using the conception of triangulation and using several sources: (i) document analysis (legal or administrative documents, protocols, reports and media reports); in-depth expert interview of direct contact and contact by telephone; (iii) quantitative questionnaire of public officials on the internet; (iv) content analysis of decision-making evaluation reports; (v) statistical analysis of the data; (vi) logical distribution and classification.

1. Description of the concept of public policy evaluation

The general definition of evaluation influences the formation of understanding the concept of public policy evaluation. Policy evaluation has a different meaning for different people and it can serve different purposes. Because there is no definition of evaluation which is accepted universally, every definition provided in the scientific literature is limited from one or another perspective because it is always possible to find the kinds of activities that are universally accepted as an evaluation but they are not comprised to the definition proposed by one or another author.

First of all, it is possible to claim that evaluation is the systematic assessment of the worth or merit of some object. Evaluation is the systematic acquisition and assessment of information to provide useful feedback about some object (Trochim, 2006). As we can see from the provided definition, the concept of evaluation is intermingled with the assessment of worth and merits of a certain object. In the context of evaluation, a merit is understood as a correspondence to evaluation standards and specifications or, in other words, whether the assessment object performs something as well as it had to. If a programme has merits, it should serve the purpose to improve peoples’ welfare. In Dahler-Larsen’s (2007) opinion, different evaluation values and standards lead to different evaluations. Therefore, it is important for the evaluators to certify the value structure, according to which the evaluation conclusions will be made. There is an opinion that the concept of quality is the equivalent of a merit (Stufflebeam, Shinkfield, 2007: 12).

In turn, analyzing the concept of worth, it is possible to distinguish that even though the merits of the evaluation object may be evaluated very well, but its worth may be low. The benefit of public policy evaluation is measured by the validity of evidence, the reliability of evaluation for the state, politicians, administrators, citizens and other intended users of the results and the impact of evaluation information on public policy, programme action or programme results. Naturally, if the policy is valuable, the highest value has to be created. The main feature of worth is the exclusiveness of the object under evaluation, which determines its competitiveness against others.

According to Widmer (2010), an evaluation is defined as a research-based service providing a systematic and transparent assessment of an object. Thus the term service underlines the fact that the evaluations are oriented towards a client (the government, the stakeholders) and are performed because of the public benefit, i.e. the services, the usage of which provides the collective benefit. However, it is necessary to add that the provision of evaluation services may influence the political environment; therefore, evaluation services may provide both advantages and disadvantages for the political environment. To be precise, the evaluation service may have not only output, but also a specific effect or impact on the environment. Thus it is possible to maintain that there is a specific relationship between the output of the evaluation service provision and the result (impact/effect). Irrespective of other factors, in order to evaluate the impact/effect of the evaluation service, a meta-evaluation is used, which helps to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of this service. Another important aspect included into Widmer’s definition, is the reference to transparency. Obviously,
the public interest demands that the evaluations would be directed to honesty, fairness, transparency and the evaluation of ethical behavior. Evaluations have to check the correspondence of the programmes to moral standards without any compromise (Stufflebeam, Shinkfield, 2007: 14).

As one can see from the provided definitions, the evaluations are performed in order to assess the merits and value of a certain object. Evaluation society has created its own vocabulary; therefore, the evaluation object is called an *evaluand* or an *evaluandum*. If the evaluation object is a person, it is suggested to call him/her an *evaluée*. The evaluator has to be sure about the definition of his/her evaluand. However, logically, it may be difficult to achieve this because different interest groups may have different opinions what is an evaluand or how it has to be described. The objects that can be evaluated comprise various activities. In many cases, the evaluation object influences the complexity and complication of the public policy evaluation process. As it is noted by Geva-May ir Thorngate (2003), programmes are an easier target for changes, as they can be easily evaluated, stopped or changed, while it is more difficult to change policies because they form the system of general approaches or the programme structure and the strategies of function. The changes also may occur before the beginning of evaluation, during it or after its finish.

2. Values of the public interventions and budgetary process

Lithuanian experience has parallels with other post-communist countries; there have not been deep discussions about the measure of public sector intervention. Summing this experience, Careja and Emmenegger (2009) note that the state was asked to provide support not only for those who lost jobs because of economy restructurization, but also for those who had to retire earlier or wanted to change qualification to meet the needs of the new competitive job market. The intervention scope has increased significantly because of the politicians’ will to approach to the model of the welfare state of old European Union members because it was aimed to finance many state functions (social security, health service, education and science, defense, economics, security of the society). However, incompatibility between these wills and possibilities has become apparent because of limited budget resources (Bivainis, 2005: 74; Kuodis, 2008: 103).

In this context it is important to note that national policies are reactive and unmatched with strategic planning documents and other programmes; the government activities are not integrated to the system of strategic planning; therefore, no attention is paid to the achievement of medium and long-term aims, as current conjectural aims dominate. This means that decisions are usually made only then, when the government has already faced the problem and there is no time to suggest alternatives and analyze them because the decision has to be made quickly, while evidence-based government policy attempts to envisage future problems and foresee the transitional solution stages. According to Diskienė, Marčiūnienė, and Vaškelis (2008), ‘only the thirteenth and fourteenth governments got a real possibility to relate their programmes with the Long-term Economic Development Strategy of Lithuania until 2015 and National Development Strategy.’ Apparently, the previously mentioned activity vectors are logical. Strategic thinking and decision – making culture could not be created in Lithuania, as well as the capacity to use the strategic analysis instruments (Smilga, Laurėnas, 2005: 1; Diskienė, Marčiūnienė, Vaškelis, 2008: 28).

Even though national budget expenses increased several times from 2002 to 2009 but important political debates took place in the input phase rather than because of the foreseen output and outcomes, which shows that the main struggle between the political parties exists because of the amount of resources allotted to the protected organizations and institutions rather than the citizens. These are listed in the table below. A wide range of beneficiaries (companies and individuals) have started to use various tax concessions, which were invented in the input phase and unchecked by ex-ante evaluation. Inapprehension of object concessions, planning of intervention and evaluation caused legal premises in the change of concession object, which was used by businessmen and residents. However, the implementation of taxation policy was ineffective because there was no operative reaction towards the changes of concession object (Kuodis, 2008: 103). Mortgage concessions preconditioned the rise of realty price bubble, the explosion of which became the beginning of the economical and financial crisis (Kuodis, 2008: 103).
As the table 1 shows, the number of budget programmes constantly increased in Lithuania in 2000–2007, and only in 2008 the number of programmes decreased to 682 programmes, in 2009 the number of budget programmes reduced to 596 and in 2010 till 502. But still there are hundreds of programmes in Lithuania, which have various priorities, initiatives, financial resources, and criteria for choosing projects and different schedules for their implementation. Besides, the programmes are oriented towards spending rather than aiming at a specific development level.

Table 1. The amount of budget programmes and dynamic of expenditures 2000–2010 year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The amount of budget programmes</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National budget expenditures, billion, Litas (together with EU funds)</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>15,7</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>26,9</td>
<td>29,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase of programme number may be explained by factors distinguished by De Leon (1987), which are the following: dynamic conservatism and coalitions of programme anti-termination. In the case of dynamic conservatism, programme administrators had to terminate the programmes after achieving their aims; however, new aims were set and legitimated, which caused continuation of the programmes. Meanwhile, anti-termination coalitions were prevalent when financing in a certain area or provision of public goods were aimed to be decreased, therefore, the Government tended to continue the activities of the programmes that had already terminated. When the new education reform (2009) started, we see that the government seeks to change the old model of higher education financing; however, opponent coalitions formed immediately, the aims of which are to resist the implementation of the new model.

A big number of programmes in Lithuania require additional human and financial resources. These are transaction costs of budget programmes, which are often invisible, but they exist. Transaction costs decrease programme efficiency and the programme itself has less resources. It is also emphasized that it is difficult to plan, require accountability, perform state audit and evaluate. Apparently, the number of programmes should be adequate to the strategic aims of the institutions. A project of the budget is not usually based on the aims of budget programmes but on the needs of appropriation managers. Programme providers and evaluators are the same subjects who implement them (National Audit Office, 2007: 16).

The programmes are prepared without clearly distinguishing activity areas and deciding on the optimal number of programmes necessary to reach one aim; the principles of proportion of programme scope are not obeyed. It is noted that the programme aim often specifies a process rather than a result. It happens that the programme aim does not have a logical connection with the aim of the strategy, and the most common problem is that the need for unreal financing is provided (KTU Savivaldos mokymo centras, 2008). It is also possible to state that the programme management system is unstable because of often changes in the rules, as well as new programmes are created, which partly double the already existing programmes, and this restricts effective and efficient usage of programme resources.

3. Reinventing the monitoring system

In Lithuanian, in different areas of public policy, monitoring rules and requirements were approved by orders of the ministers or other legal acts after accessing the European Union (Gudelis, 2009: 93). Sector ministries collect quite a big amount of performance information; however, data quality is of an average level. Municipalities are also involved into the process of collection and presentation the monitoring data, thus the burden of data collection went to the street – level bureaucracy, who is already over tasked and who rarely get some feedbacks how the data are used in the further decision making or if it is used at all. This influences data
quality because lower level public servants are not willing to do routine tasks, that possibly will not make any benefit for their work. As there is a big number of uncoordinated monitoring systems and a centralized strategic planning system, it is necessary to create a national integrated monitoring system.

![Diagram of Monitoring Cycle and Existing Issues]

**Figure 1.** Monitoring cycle and existing issues

In the monitoring system being analyzed, one can see the obstacles prevalent in different stages of monitoring cycle (Figure 1). Insufficient regulation of the monitoring process and weak quality of evaluation criteria are faced in the preparatory stage of monitoring (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 4). According to the conception, it is necessary to regulate monitoring in order to ensure the quality of evaluation criteria because the documents of institutions do not define monitoring implementation of activity and the processes of document analysis, as well as personal employees’ responsibility for achieving the aims and objectives (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 4). On the one hand, the appearance of such regulation, which provides a mandate for monitoring, may be an impetus, legitimizing monitoring in Lithuania, where the necessity of a legal instrument is a condition for each government reform. On the other hand, the regulation would not guarantee that efforts will be put to create a monitoring system.

It was found out that in the preparatory stage of monitoring, only one fourth of institutions have methodical explanations, where the methodology for counting criteria importance would be provided (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 4). Nowadays, the public administration institutions have to think of the criteria themselves, as there are no methodologies or rule how to do that. While formulating the criteria, there is a lack of leadership and participation of highest-level authorities and politicians. The criteria are mainly formulated by the responsible officials, who lack knowledge and experience (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 4). Annual monitoring plans are not formed in the institutions or departments responsible for monitoring. The activities are fragmented, and sometimes they are influenced by the European Union orders, which may be evaluated positively, as it is probable that the good practice will be used for learning purposes.
In the implementation stage of monitoring, a superficial analysis is sometimes made while evaluating the degree of criteria achievement. In the strategic documents, the institutions do not formulate logical programme models or theories of change, therefore, the reasons for not achieving the criteria are rarely provided (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 5). According to the public servant,

While making an audit, logical nonsense’s are often noticeable. For instance, there is a programme and its evaluation criteria. Evaluating the achievement of criteria, it seems that they are achieved in 200 per cent, while evaluating in terms of money; it is noticeable that a part from the subsidies of this programme is ‘moved’ to another programme, i.e. almost a half of the programme value. <…> Then we express a lot of pretensions about the evaluation criteria and that the achieved results of the programme are not taken into consideration while providing financing for the next year. It is also clear that evaluation criteria are the main problem.

This example expresses the performance paradox (Van Thiel, Leeuw, 2002: 267) very clearly, which is not foreseen, because public servants attempt to increase the level of criteria achievement to an unbelievable degree. This happens because of lack of analysis of expenses usage and it is not aimed at using monitoring information for making decisions. The ministries hardly use monitoring information preparing budgets or accounting for the usage of expenses or they use this information for choice (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 5).

The research, ordered by the Ministry of the Interior (2009), analyses the introduction of performance management characteristics in all ministries in Lithuania. The analysis of the data about monitoring and evaluation shows that the level of introduction depends on the definition of monitoring and evaluation at the ministries. It is seen that monitoring and evaluation are introduced the best in the ministries that dispose only 21 % of the budget resources (Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Transport and Communication, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Table 2). Monitoring and evaluation are introduced by 100 % by the by the customer of the research, the Ministry of the Interior. This may also be treated as an unintended consequence (Van Thiel, Leeuw, 2002: 267) of performance measurement because the ministries think of the criteria applicable to themselves in order to correspond to them. This way they can use the information and attempt to manipulate the evaluations, which does not correspond to the logic of organizational education. On the contrary, the introduction of monitoring and evaluation is bad in the ministries that dispose 67 % of the budget resources. According to the features of monitoring and evaluation distinguished in the research, the Ministry of Finance has neither monitoring, nor evaluation. Both elements are very poorly introduced in the Ministry of Agriculture which has a department of national programmes monitoring and evaluation (30 %).

In the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the capacities of monitoring and evaluation were trained and developed while implementing a project of the World Bank. The project was pursued for five years; the civil servants participated in the educational programme that lasted for three years, also a permanent annual preparation of social reports was initiated. However, according the mentioned research, there is no monitoring in this ministry as well and evaluation is introduced only in 15 %. In the monitoring conception, the lack of leadership was mentioned while defining criteria; however, it can be seen that the Ministry of the Interior takes the role of leadership and attempts to show which ministry has the management system introduced the best but this is done grounding on the criteria that do not correspond to the actual situation of the ministries.

In the final monitoring stage, the following problems are possible: monitoring information is used for accounting rather than for management improvement; monitoring information is usually used preparing reports, but it is not aimed at improving internal processes of the institution. It is emphasized in the conception that prepared reports are poor quality and they lack transparency because the data sources are not always revealed, the benefit for the society is explained insufficiently, the reaction towards the results and activity outcomes is not shown (Lithuanian Government, 2009: 5–6). In our opinion, this is done purposefully because if the sources are not provided, an external analyst or evaluator will not be able to perform a meta-evaluation of the prepared report.
Table 2. Introductions of monitoring and evaluation in the ministries (Prepared according Ministry of Interior 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>State expenditures in the ministry, percentage</th>
<th>Quantitative assessment of monitoring, percentage*</th>
<th>Quantitative assessment of evaluation, percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Security and Labour</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education and Science</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport and Communication</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Defence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* – horizontal line (good), if the proper weight of indicators equal 80% and more; grey colour (satisfactory) – if the proper weight of indicators more than 59, but less than 80%; Down diagonal line (poor), if the proper weight of indicators 50% inclusively.

4. Managing evaluation function

Coordination of evaluation function. National audit office, as an active supervisor of programme implementation, enumerated the absence of appropriate evaluation system as one of the problems, i.e. the evaluations for financing the programmes of Lithuanian public sector institutions lack qualitative evaluation criteria. The respondent confirmed this:

In the national level, we started creating evaluation system, first requirements appeared in the legal acts to perform evaluation, but the system itself is still not created, as there no evaluation skills or methodology, and conclusions are still not used in decision making, i.e. refusing budget programmes or continuing them.

The overall impression from the literature review was that the majority of the researchers were discouraged and skeptical that Lithuania does not have an institution responsible for the coordination of budget programmes evaluation and monitoring, while the reports are only started to be integrated into further planning. According to Vilpišauskas (2007), this was influenced by the lack of evaluation capacity, political and institutional motivators. The reform is not finished in the central level of public administration and even though the number of qualified human resources, being able to implement projects according to the requirements of the changing environment, is increasing, there is still lack of them. One should admit that the first evaluation plan should be prepared at 2012, however it isn’t publicly available yet, and that causes the fact that there is no budget to hire external evaluators. The evaluation methodology was approved by the Ministry of Finance, however Lithuanian evaluation community as main stakeholder in evaluation process wasn’t involved in the disputes about the content of methodology.

Evaluation capacity. Programme evaluation is fragmented, even though the Government order for the evaluation of budget programme implementation, which existed until 2007, prescribed that the ministers, heads of Government institutions have to provide programme implementation reports and evaluation of aims
fulfillment according to evaluation criteria so that the evaluation results would be discussed in the Strategic Planning Committee and the Government. In addition, the requirement to collect information did not appear in the programme management mechanism to enable it to be comparable with other projects, programmes and to be meaningfully used for analysis and education.

Only two ministries (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture) have evaluation departments, while such skills have not been developed in other ministries and municipalities at all, thus there is a gap in this area and, consequently, the skills of report evaluation are poorly developed. In Lithuania, a more significant part of evaluation is focused on resources rather than outcomes and administrative processes rather than economical and social impacts. When programme implementation problems appeared, institutionalization of evaluation system started. In the present situation, there are no appropriate and developed procedures how to initiate, implement and use evaluations in the process of public policy. The hierarchy of central bureaucracy is dominated by lawyers, for whom evaluation is an unknown exercise. According to the respondent,

In the institutions, which had the departments of statutory officials for a long time, the realization of evaluation function faces quite a bureaucratized administration culture.

One of the qualities of Lithuanian administration culture is that departments are subordinate to the Ministries rather than the Government. The contractual research is provided to the ministry but not to the Prime Minister’s Office, which impedes the diffusion of knowledge in the public management system. On the other hand, the Prime Minister’s Office may press the departments of the ministries, especially if it has a strong support from the Prime Minister; however, evaluation performance and usage is fragmented in Lithuania. Political parties impede the professionalization of bureaucracy. Being weak, political parties attempt to weaken a potential competitor (Dvorak, 2008: 101). It should also be noted that the existing tradition of administration in Lithuania and administrative law contributed quite a lot to the evaluation of the civil servants for the legitimization of their activities rather than their results. To be precise, first the procedures appeared but nobody thought about the outcomes of public interventions. The Lithuanian public service was politicized for a long time after regaining the independence, and only after adopting the new public service law, politicization significantly decreased. Therefore, qualificational maturation of Lithuanian bureaucracy was significantly late and even though unqualified bureaucracy managed to compete with partocracy (Laurėnas, 2001: 221), it still remained responsible for routine provision of public services and has not become an expert of the prestigious evaluation function. Naturally, the ability to compete is influenced by the fact that the bureaucracy communicates with clients and interest groups much more often than politicians; therefore, it has more information what is appropriate in politics.

In the survey, it was asked what role is played by evaluation in the process of formation national budget and implementing it (figure 3). The biggest part of the respondents (34 per cent) emphasized that the role of evaluation is not very important, while 32 per cent of the respondents think that it is important, and 18 per cent of the respondents claim that the role of evaluation is very important. Also, 8 per cent noted that the role of evaluation in making national budget and implementing it is not important and the same number of respondents said that they do not know.

The same question was provided to some respondents of the interview. Respondents believe that, it is possible to maintain that in the present situation, the change from the subsystem of evaluation of the EU Structural funds to the subsystem of making and implementation of national budget. In this subsystem, the clear evaluation function is little developed because the budget making process is of political nature. Public servants avoid performing an in-depth interim evaluation while making the budget because they may experience political pressure. For this purpose, there is a possibility to avoid clash with politicians. The Ministry of Finance does not perform regulatory impact assessment while preparing a ruling about the distribution of subsidies according to the programmes confirmed by the budget of the Lithuanian Republic for the year ‘N’ because it is claimed that it is not a normative act but a task of technical character, for which a regulatory impact assessment note is not necessary (LR Finansų Ministerija, 2010). In principle, the National audit
office provides its position in this stage; however, it depends on Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) whether its remarks and recommendations would be taken into consideration and how it manages to use the additional value of such evaluation. The situation of programme evaluation has not changed significantly when provisions about the possibilities to review budget programme appeared in the strategic planning methodology, as a systematic review and evaluation is performed by a small number of institutions.

![Figure 2. Role of evaluation in the budgetary process of Lithuania](image)

**Conclusions**

After the analysis of public intervention values and the functioning of the budget process, a conclusion can be made: Lithuania does not learn from earlier lessons. Imitating the Western experience and forming pre-conditions for the unmeasured interventions, the point of view had to change in the new situation of the crisis; however, while allotting money, nobody mentions or promises that such interventions will be evaluated. The evaluators do not dare to tell the society that interventions have to be measured and evaluated. The present political regime sends signals to the international business and policy community that “something is being done” and it is invested into evidence-based symbols of politics. It is wrong to think that symbol politics does not have consequences. There is some basis to claim that the evaluation function is scarcely developed in the formation and implementation of national budget, the decision impact process is not performed, even though the budget is confirmed by a different law every year and it is also comprised from strategic elements. From this point of view, the budget is the basis for the Government programme or the coalition platform. Apparently, the budget process has not become a learning process.

The theory teaches that monitoring requires methodological accuracy; however, in Lithuania many uncoordinated systems of monitoring and evaluation are legalized, which require an integrated monitoring and evaluation strategy. In the monitoring cycle, the existing problems show the consequences of the lack of monitoring coordination and planning: insufficient regulation of the monitoring process; poor quality of evaluation criteria; superficial data analysis; undeveloped analysis of monitoring data; unused monitoring information in order to improve management; poor quality of activity reports. The results of the research show that the introduction of monitoring and evaluation into the ministries depends on their definition criteria. The meta-analysis of another research forms the pre-conditions to maintain that the unforeseen paradoxes of activity measurement appear in Lithuania when the ministries think of the criteria that correspond to them with the aim to have a leading position in the activity management area. Unfortunately, the evaluators
do not object against such activities while carrying out such investigation. Besides, there is no programme evaluation coordinator, even though several reorientations to the performance of coordination and strategic planning functions are performed in the office of the Prime Minister. Political parties inhibit the creation of evaluation competencies for a long time: as they are weak, they attempt to weaken their potential rival, i.e. state office.

References


Santrauka


Prieš dešimtmetį pateiktos informacijos apie viešosios politikos instrumentų taikymo padarinius yra gerokai daugiau, palyginti su viešosios politikos vertinimo informacija, pristatyta tik prieš keletą metų. Svarbu išsiaiškinti, kaip viešosios politikos vertinimas taikomas Lietuvos politinėje ir administracinėje aplinkoje. Be abejo, nebūtina laukti dešimtmečių, kol atsiras žinių apie viešosios politikos vertinimo taikymą pokomo

PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: vertinimas, programa, viešasis administravimas, stebėseną.

JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: D730, D780, D790, H830, L380